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Abstract of the Dissertation 
A Safety-Critical Software Design and Verification Technique 
by 
Stephen Sungdeok Cha 
Doctor of Philosophy in Information and Computer Science 
University of California, Irvine, 1991 
Professor Nancy G. Leveson, Chair 
Safe software can be developed by applying a safety-oriented design method and 
establishing good safety management procedures. However, safety-oriented design has 
not received much research attention in the past. 
This dissertation proposes a software design method whose goal is to minimize 
the amount of safety-critical code and to produce a design whose safety can be verified. 
Starting from the software safety requirements, backward analysis is used to identify 
the safety-critical modules and derive their safety constraints. Safety constraints play 
an important role since they become the criteria against which the safety of detailed 
design is verified. This dissertation also proposes the use of information hiding princi-
ples to implement a "firewall." The firewall protects the safety-critical modules from 
the safety-independent modules, thereby minimizing the amount of safety verifica-
tion effort required in formally certifying the design safety. The complexity of design 
safety verification is further reduced by employing an incremental and selective verifi-
cation. This dissertation argues that concurrency decisions on safety-critical software 
must be based on careful trade-off analysis and demonstrates that concurrent designs 
do not necessarily require exhaustive concurrency safety verification. An application 
of the proposed safety-oriented design method is demonstrated using a subsystem of 
TCAS II (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System). 
Management aspects of software safety are important because of the direct and 
significant impact management has on safety. This dissertation examines how to 
organize safety-critical projects and distribute safety responsibilities. 
IX 
Chapter 1 
Approaches to Software Safety 
1.1 Introduction 
Software safety became a critical concern in the 1980s because of the increased 
use of software to control safety-critical systems. A system is considered safety-
critical if system behavior can result in death, injury, property loss, or environmental 
damage[27]. Twenty years ago, software failures merely annoyed users who had to 
perform manual recovery actions such as reissuing checks with the correct amounts. 
Now the failure of safety-critical software can have catastrophic consequences when 
effective recovery activities do not exist. For example, a software error on the Therac 
25 therapy machine was responsible for the death of four patients[19, 24]. The list 
of computer-related accidents, reported to the ACM RISKS forum and selectively 
published in the ACM Software Engineering Notes[41], is long and growing. Some 
safety-critical computer systems have been the subject of public controversy. 
In the Airbus A320[37], a commercial fly-by-wire aircraft, almost all of the direct 
mechanical links from the cockpit to the aircraft parts have been computerized 1 ; pilot 
commands are interpreted by the flight computers that send commands to the motors 
1The only surfaces retaining mechanical control of the hydraulics are the rudder and pitch rim. 
1 
2 
to move the appropriate parts. The A320s have been in service for about three yea.rs 
now, and software has not been proven to be the direct cause of the two crashes 
that have occurred to date. Yet, the safety of its control software and the use of 
the N-version programming technique[26, 48) as a means of developing safe software 
continues to be debated2 . Some computer scientists are concerned because: 
• The embedded software is designed to override any of the pilot's commands that 
the software determines to be dangerous. They have questioned the wisdom 
of such design decisions and have argued that the pilots should be given the 
ultimate authority especially in emergency situations. 
• The results of some controlled experiments suggest that the N-version program-
ming technique may not be very effective due to correlated failures[25, 29). A 
theoretical model of N-version programming showed that a small degree of cor-
related failures can significantly reduce the degree of reliability improvement[7). 
Other safety-critical systems include air traffic control, aircraft collision avoid-
ance (TCAS), nuclear power plant shutdown, and patient monitoring. The safety of 
software controlling these systems has significant and direct impact on the lives of 
the general public. 
Recently, Forester and Morrison[9] proposed an international ban on the use 
of computers in controlling safety-critical systems, expressing concern that current 
software engineering technology is not mature enough to put human lives at risk. 
Their concerns are valid, and the use of software in controlling safety-critical systems 
must be carefully analyzed against the feasible alternatives such as using electro-
mechanical controls or depending on manual controls. However, the increasing and 
2Extensive debates on the safety of the A320 aircraft and its control software have appeared in 
the ACM Risks Forum since May 1988. 
I Causes 11 1985 1987 1989 
Software 33.5% 38.8% 62.1% 
Hardvrnre 28.8% 22.43 6.6% 
Maintenance 18.6% 12.6% 15.1% 
Operation 8.8% 11.9% 15.1% 
Environment 6.0% 9.5% 5.9% 
Others 4.2% 4.8% 5.3% 
Table 1.1: Causes of Tandem System Outages from 1985 to 1989 
irreversible trend of controlling safety-critical systems via software shows that most 
people think the advantages outweigh the potential hazards. 
Most safety-critical systems are embedded systems, where software is only a part 
of a larger system, which can be very large, complicated, and expensive to develop. 
The entire system could consist of a collection of distributed hardware, software, 
and human operators. Therefore, the system may fail due to permanent or transient 
hardware failures, software failures, hardware-induced software failures[l 7], operator 
mistakes, or environmental events. 
Hardware reliability has improved impressively in the last few years; hardware 
failures are no longer a major cause of system failures. This trend is especially true 
with the availability of commercial fault-tolerant computers. Software improvements, 
however, have been less impressive. Based on the reported causes for Tandem system 
outages from 1985 to 1989 as shown in Table 1.1, Gray[ll] recently argued that 
software has become the major bottleneck in further improving system reliability. 
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The development of perfectly safe software is impossible and unnecessary. A 
realistic goal is to develop software that is free of hazardous beliavior. Development 
of such software, however, remains a challenging task because: 
• Most of the safety-critical systems are real-time systems where the sequencing 
and timing of input events are determined by the real-world (environment) and 
not by the program. Furthermore, a real-time system must meet its deadlines. 
Timeliness of real-time system outputs is as important as their correctness. 
• The demands on the system may occur in parallel rather than in sequence. The 
system must react correctly to multiple events within the limit of its specified 
load and capacity. For example, a traffic light controller at an intersection 
must sense pedestrians as well as cars approaching the intersection from all 
four directions. All these events may occur simultaneously or in a very short 
interval. 
• The competitive and profit-oriented industrial environment always forces com-
panies to develop safety-critical software with a minimal allocation of resources. 
The constraints are usually further compounded by the pressure of meeting 
deadlines. 
1.2 Dissertation Overview 
Safe software can be developed by applying a safety-oriented design method 
and establishing good safety management procedures. However, safety-oriented de-
sign has not received much research attention. The United Kingdom software safety 
standard(38], for example, provides little help beyond the following: 
The design shall minimize the extent of safety critical software. The safety 
critical software shall be isolated from other equipment functions. The 
detailed design shall avoid common mode failures with hazardous conse-
quences. Fault tolerance, defensive programming, graceful degradation, 
and fail-safe design techniques shall be used when possible. The design 
shall be hierarchical and modular with well-defined interfaces between 
modules. 
In essence, the standard specifies general principles for developing safety-critical 
software design without providing techniques about how these principles might be 
accomplished. 
This dissertation proposes a safety-oriented design method that consists of the 
following: 
• An analysis procedure guiding the high-level design phase where the safety-
critical modules are identified and their safety constraints, a set of conditions 
whose truth are necessary to ensure safety, are derived. 
• A selective and incremental safety verification technique where the safety of the 
detailed design can be certified before coding begins. 
• Various design techniques to enhance safety including reducing the probability 
of timing-related errors and using programming language constructs designed 
to deal with abnormal data or control errors at run-time. 
• A safety-oriented software management hierarchy. 
Chapter 2 reviews the previous research on software design techniques, security 
design techniques, and software safety verification techniques. Chapter 3 extends 
the work of Leveson[27] and proposes a safety-oriented software design method. The 
method consists of a design hazard analysis and design safety verification technique. 
Chapter 4 proposes a safety-oriented software project management hierarchy. Chapter 
6 
5 demonstrates an application of the design method and the verification technique 
on the official design of TCAS II (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System). 
Chapter 6 draws conclusions and discusses directions for future research. 
I 
Chapter 2 
Survey and Evaluation of Previous 
Research 
This chapter surveys previous research on software design techniques, security 
design techniques, and software safety verification techniques. A thorough survey 
of software design techniques or security design techniques is impractical since the 
subjects are extremely broad. Therefore, this chapter briefly surveys and evaluates 
previous research from a software safety viewpoint. Finally, software safety verifica-
tion techniques are reviewed. 
2.1 Software Design Methodology 
Following the recognition of a software crisis in the late 1960s, intensive research 
on software design techniques gave birth to many design methodologies. However, no 
software design technique classification schemes are widely accepted in the literature. 
Freeman and Wasserman[lO], in their popular IEEE tutorial, classify software design 
techniques as either process-oriented or data-oriented. Yau and Tsai[56] adopt es-
sentially the same classification although the design techniques listed for each group 
7 
s 
are different. Pressman(46], on the other hand, further classifies the process-oriented 
design techniques as either data flow-oriented or data structure-oriented design tech-
niques (e.g., Jackson system design). The process-oriented design techniques include, 
but are not limited to, functional decomposition, structured design, structured anal-
ysis and design technique (SADT), Jackson design methodology, Hierarchy-lnput-
Process-Output (HIPO). Examples of data-oriented techniques are object-oriented 
and conceptual database design techniques. 
Experts do not always agree on such terms as design techniques (or methodolo-
gies), design principles, and design notations. For example, Yau and Tsai list modular 
programming as a design technique while Fairley[8] classifies modularity, used in the 
same context, as one of the fundamental design principles. Neither the classification 
of software design techniques nor the definition of sometimes blurry and abstract 
terms is the subject of this research. Therefore, this dissertation arbitrarily adopts 
the scheme used by Pressman and evaluates each approach for its applicability to 
safety-critical software design. 
Data flow-oriented design techniques, the most general and perhaps the most 
widely used approaches, are certainly applicable to safety-critical software design. 
The resulting design, however, exhibits different characteristics depending on the 
selected decomposition criteria. Various module decomposition criteria have been 
proposed in the literature. Stepwise refinement[54] can be adapted as a decomposition 
criterion, and each of the major processing steps can be implemented as a module. 
Principles such as information hiding[42] can guide the decomposition process. The 
"uses hierarchy," proposed by Parnas[44), is another decomposition criterion where 
software maintainability (e.g., the ease of extension or contraction) is emphasized. 
I 
9 
While these decomposition criteria promote the properties any good software design 
must possess, they do not specifically address safety issues. 
The applicability of data structure-oriented design techniques[l8), proven ef-
fective and widely used in business (or data-processing) applications, appear to be 
severely limited (if applicable at all) when it comes to safety-critical software designs. 
Harel and Pnueli[14) used the term "transformational systems" to capture the es-
sential characteristics of such applications where the primary function of software is 
almost always to process the stream of input data (e.g., transaction records) and to 
produce the outputs in the required format (e.g., transaction summary). Much of 
software complexity in such applications stems from the need to manipulate compli-
cated input and output data structures. The algorithms to determine the values of the 
. outputs themselves tend to be relatively straightforward. Therefore, it makes sense to 
base the design of such software on input and output data structures. However, safety-
critical software is primarily found in embedded systems whose primary function is 
process control. Much of the complexity in developing process control software lies 
in determining how to properly control the environment. Inputs to software, usually 
denoting the occurrence of environmental events, often arrive from the sensors in the 
form of interrupts with relatively simple (if any) data structures (e.g., numeric values 
or escape sequences). Similarly, software outputs, often generated to the actuators, 
rarely require the manipulation of complicated data structures. 
Object-oriented design[3] is another technique one can use to design safety-
critical software. Object-oriented design proceeds by initially identifying the objects 
that the software must manipulate. The data structure of the objects as well as the 
set of operations to be performed on the objects are subsequently identified, and the 
operations to be performed on an object are most likely to be grouped into a module 
10 
(e.g., a package). Although this dissertation does not specifically address safety-
cri tical software development using object-oriented design techniques, the analysis 
procedure presented in the dissertation can be applied to object-oriented design. 
2.2 Security Design Techniques 
Since society has become more dependent on computers for information pro-
cessing and storage, computer security has been an active research topic. An orga-
nization must protect private and proprietary information from unauthorized access. 
Computer security is a critical concern not only to the financial success of a corpora-
tion but also to national security. Although there is no single strategy for achieving 
security, previous research has focused on cryptography and access control techniques. 
Denning[5] defines cryptography as the science and. study of secret writing. 
Privacy is preserved by transforming a plaintext NI into a ciphertext C using the 
enciphering key EK before storing or transmitting information. The authorized user, 
who has a cryptographic key DK, performs a decipherment or decryption operation 
to access the plaintext. A cryptography technique must satisfy the following security 
requirements to be useful[5]: 
• It should be computationally infeasible for a cryptanalyst to systematically 
determine the plain text M from intercepted ciphertext C. 
• It should be computationally infeasible for a cryptanalyst to systematically 
determine the deciphering transformation from intercepted ciphertext C, even 
if the corresponding plaintext NI is known. 
11 
An example of an encryption method is the Data. Encryption Standard (DES), speci-
fied by the National Bureau of Sta.ndards(36] for use on unclassified U.S. Government 
applications. Cryptography techniques by themselves, however, have no direct rela-
tion to software safety, and further discussion is omitted. 
The fundamental requirements of access control and multi-level security tech-
mques are: 
• Never allow access to or operation on information by the users without proper 
authorization. 
• Never deny an access to or operation on information by authorized users. 
Access control mechanisms can be either discretionary or mandatory depending on 
who controls the access policies (e.g., user versus system). Discretionary access control 
mechanisms proposed in the literature are passwords, capability, and access control 
lists. 
When access control is based on a password, the user assigns an individual 
password to each object (i.e., file) that must be protected. The technique quickly 
becomes impractical in a large organization. 
When access control is based on capability, each user is assigned a capability list 
that specifies the set of objects the user is authorized to access as well as the mode of 
access for each object. However, the management of capability-based access control 
may be inefficient. For example, when· a file is deleted, the capability list of all the 
users must be searched and updated. Otherwise, a user may acquire an unauthorized 
access when another file is created with the same name. 
12 
With an access control list that specifies the authorized users and their access 
mode on each object, managing user access to an object is simple. However, access 
to the objects may be inefficient because the associated access control list must be 
scanned whenever an access is requested. Grouping users (e.g., by the projects), 
assigning suitable default access modes (e.g., allowing reads but prohibiting writes 
within the group), and using efficient searching technique (e.g., hashing) can allow 
efficient and secure access. 
Multi-level security techniques were developed for the Department of Defense to 
protect classified military information stored in computers. All information is assigned 
a classiflcation level, and each user is assigned a clearance level. A classification or 
clearance level consists of: 
• Sensitivity Level: Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret. 
• Category: A list of subjects or keywords on the contents of information (e.g., 
NATO and nuclear). 
A user can access the object if and only if the user's clearance level 'dominates' 
the object's classification level. For example, a user with top. secret clearance can 
read confidential documents while a user with an unclassified clearance cannot read 
secret documents. However, writes are prohibited to prevent the transfer of top 
secret information to an unclassified document. The protection of resources using 
access control mechanisms is an essential property of a secure system. Without such 
mechanisms, a system becomes useless (and even harmful) since no guarantee can be 
made on system security. Furthermore, secure systems must preserve security despite 
dynamic changes (e.g., classification and clearance levels) and authorization transfers 
among users. 
1:3 
Similarly, safety-critical software development needs to separate the safety-
cri tical modules from the safety-independent modules. Fortunately, the access control 
issues for safety-critical software are simpler than the ones for secure systems. Access 
control in safety-critical software is a desirable (rather than a mandatory) property. 
The identification and proper protection of safety-critical modules simplifies the ef-
fort required for safety certification, but they do not necessarily make the system 
safer. Furthermore, the safety attribute of a module is static and does not change 
at run-time, and there is no need to deal with the transfer of safety attributes from 
one module to another. Therefore, adequate access control is provided as long as the 
safety-critical variables are never shared between the safety-critical and the safety-
independent modules. This separation guarantees that the safety-critical behavior of 
software is completely determined by the semantic definitions of the safety-critical 
modules. 
The security kernel, a small component of the system whose correctness is suf-
ficient to verify the security of the entire system, is the most widely used technique 
for building secure systems. The kernel can encapsulate the safety-critical modules 
as suggested by Rushby[50]. He showed that the kernel can enforce "negative proper-
ties" (i.e., absence of commission faults) but not "positive properties" (i.e., absence 
of omission faults) of the system. The positive properties cannot be enforced because 
"no matter what 'good' properties a kernel may possess, there can be no guarantee 
that the rest of the system will use the kernel correctly." Safety, however, can be en-
forced as long as the safety-critical resources are under the total control of the safety 
kernel. 
I 
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Figure 2.1: Software Safety Techniques 
2.3 Software Safety Verification Techniques 
14 
Software safety has a relatively short history as a research topic. The most 
comprehensive and authoritative survey on software safety to date is provided by 
Leveson[27]. The paper discusses what software safety issues are, why software safety 
is an important topic, and how software safety might be achieved. 
The importance of applying systematic and rigorous safety verifications at the 
end of each development phase has been stressed by Leveson[28], and several safety 
verification techniques have been proposed in the literature (Figure 2.1 ). While some 
techniques, such as software fault tree analysis, are general enough to be applicable 
LS 
throughout software development, the applicability of others are limited to specific 
phases. 
Leveson and Stolzy[34] demonstrate how software safety requirements can be 
derived through the modeling of the system operation using timed Petri Nets[45] with 
an extended notation to allow the modeling of faults and failures. The goal of software 
safety is to fulfill the part of system safety requirements allocated to software. In other 
words, software safety is essentially a system property, and any discussion of software 
safety outside the context of system safety would be meaningless. Reachability graph 
analysis derived from the Petri Net model of the system reveals the potential failure 
modes, and software safety requirements can be derived to prevent their occurrence, 
either by imposing timing constraints on the events or by requiring software to control 
the occurrence of event sequences. They developed the concept of "critical states" as a 
means of avoiding exhaustive generation of the reachability graphs without sacrificing 
the expressive or analytical power of the model. 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is another technique that can be used to derive soft-
ware safety requirements. It was developed in the 1960s for the safety analysis of the 
Minuteman missile system and has become one of the most widely used system safety 
techniques. The fault tree handbook[53] explains the technique as follows: 
Fault tree analysis can be simply described as an analytical technique, 
whereby an undesired state of the system is specified (usually a state that 
is critical from a safety standpoint), and the system is then analyzed in the 
context of its environment and operation to find all credible ways in which 
the undesired event can occur. The fault tree itself is a graphic model 
of the various parallel and sequential combinations of faults (or system 
states) that will result in the occurrence of the predefined undesired event. 
The faults can be events that are associated with component hardware 
failures, human errors, or any other pertinent events which can lead to 
the undesired event. A fault tree thus depicts the logical relationships of 
basic events that lead to the undesired event - which is the top event of 
the fault tree. 
It is important to understand that a fault tree is not a model of all 
possible failures or all possible causes for system failure. A fault tree is tai-
lored to its top event which corresponds to some particular system failure 
mode, and the fault tree thus includes only those faults that contribute 
to this top event. Moreover, these faults are not exhaustive - they cover 
only the most credible faults as assessed by the analyst. 
16 
Software safety requirements can be derived by expanding the system fault trees 
to the software interface levels and by identifying the failure modes that the software 
may cause or to which it may contribute. 
Software functional and safety requirements must be analyzed before the design 
activity begins. .Jaffe and Leveson[20] developed a definition of the logical com-
pleteness of the requirements. This work was further expanded by .Jaffe, Leveson, 
Heimdahl, and Melhart[21] to include a set of criteria that detect flaws in the black-
box specification of real-time software. The criteria are specified using a general 
behavioral specification model called a requirements state machine and is applicable 
to any specification languages based on state machines (e.g., statecharts[12, 13]) .. 
J aha~ian and Mok[22] developed a procedure to perform timing-related safety 
analysis on software requirements using a formal logic called Real-Time Logic (RTL). 
The requirements are represented in the event-action model and later mechanically 
transformed into a set of RTL formulas and subsequently into the equivalent formulas 
in Pres burger arithmetic with uninterpreted functions. This technique, as the authors 
point out, is applicable mainly to the software requirements and, in particular, anal-
ysis of the timing-related behaviors. 
The most commonly used software safety technique applied to the code level is 
software fault tree analysis (SFTA). The technique was adapted from system fault tree 
17 
analysis by Leveson and Harvey[30] and also in parallel by Taylor[51]. Leveson and 
Harvey successfully applied the technique to sequential software controlling the oper-
ations of a scientific satellite. They report on the detection of an error that remained 
undetected despite the extensive functional testing previously performed on the soft-
ware. It was a serious error that could have caused the destruction of the satellite. 
Subsequent research extended the SFTA technique to more complex languages with 
features such as concurrency and exception handling[4, 33]. The analysis is guided 
by the use of statement templates that describe the failure modes of each statement. 
This approach is the same as the one used in formal axiomatic verification[6, 16] where 
· the weakest preconditions are derived that are necessary to satisfy the given postcon-
ditions. In fact, SFTA can be seen as a graphical application of formal axiomatic 
verification where the postconditions describe the hazardous conditions rather than 
the correctness conditions. 
The informal nature of SFTA allows the results of other analysis techniques 
(e.g., timing analysis using Petri Nets) to be incorporated into the fault tree and 
allows the entire system, including hardware, software, and operators, to be system-
atically analyzed[39]. unfortunately, the informal nature of the technique is also its 
major weakness because the success of the technique heavily depends on the ability 
of the analysts. SFTA is essentially a structured walk-through technique with special 
emphasis on safety issues rather than correctness ones. Therefore, the technique is 
applicable in virtually all phases of the software life cycle. 
The SFTA technique has been successfully applied on several, mostly classified, 
military projects including F18-E and F16 control software. It was also used in 
verifying the safety of Canadian nuclear power plant shutdown software that consisted 
of about 6,000 lines of Pascal and Fortran code. The overhead was moderate in that 
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Figure 2.2: Run-Time Safety Environment 
the analysis took approximately two man-months including training. Although no 
errors were detected using SFTA, the technique wa~ useful in making the software 
more robust against errors and in developing the contents of run-time assertions to 
detect potentially hazardous internal software states. According to Leveson, who 
helped engineers to perform SFTA, the engineers found the technique to be effective 
and easy to use, and they are using it on other safety-critical software projects. 
Leveson, Shimeall, Stolzy, and Thomas·[32] proposed a general run-time struc-
ture, called a safety executive (Figure 2.2), where the hazardous run-time system 
states are detected by evaluating safety assertions(31] inserted in the code. The 
causes of hazardous run-time system states include: 
l 
I 
i 
I 
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• Erroneous safety requirements due to an incorrect hazard analysis. This m-
cludes erroneous assumptions made about the environment. 
• Software design errors not detected by validation and verification techniques. 
• Environmental failures, operator errors, or hardware failures that affect software 
even if software correctly implements the requirements. 
Upon the detection of the occurrence of hazardous system states, the safety execu-
tive initiates appropriate recovery procedures such as a reset, shut-down, or fail-safe 
processmg. 
It is possible to design the application to include features that monitor the 
system states and initiate recovery routines whenever necessary, but the use of general 
run-time safety environments such as safety executives[32] is preferred (Figure 2.3). 
Although the separation of the safety responsibilities may not necessarily reduce the 
degree of the correlated failures between the application and the safety executives, it 
reduces the complexity of the application and enhances the reusability of the safety 
executive software. 
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Safety-critical software 
Known safe state 
reset, 
shutdown, 
fail-safe 
environmental 
events 
required 
outputs 
Potentially hazardous 
state unless corrected 
failure 
to restore 
to safe state 
Hazardous system states 
necessary condition 
for mishap 
(Unrecoverable) 
Safety mishap state 
Figure 2.3: Roles of Safety Executive 
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Chapter 3 
A Safety-Oriented Design Method 
3.1 Introduction 
The goal of a safety-oriented design method, such as that shown in Figure 3.1, 
is to minimize the amount of safety-critical code and to produce a design whose safety 
can be certified. Safety constraints, i.e., the set of conditions whose truths are neces-
sary to ensure safety, play an important role in designing safety-critical software. The 
safety constraints of a module1 describe the desired postconditions2 , and backward 
analysis can be applied to determine the necessary weakest preconditions. A module 
can be called "inherently safe" or "safety-independent" if the safety constraints are 
TRUE. If, on the other hand, the design contains a module whose safety constraints 
are FALSE, the design must be revised since the module is "inherently unsafe." All 
other modules are called "safety-critical," and the algorithmic design of the module 
must ensure that the safety constraints and the functional requirements are always 
satisfied. 
1The term 'module' is used to refer to the entire software or any of its component - either a 
procedure or a function. 
2If the module consists of non-terminating cyclic routines, this refers to the end of a processing 
cycle. 
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Software learns about the occurrence of environmental events to which it must 
react only via externally visible inputs. Similarly, software controls the environment 
only by generating externally visible outputs. Therefore, the initial safety constraints 
must be formulated as a predicate involving only the externally visible inputs, outputs, 
and time (if applicable); the initial safety constraints are equivalent to either the 
software safety requirements or their negation depending on how the requirements 
are formulated. As the modules are decomposed successively, the safety constraints 
for each module need to be refined. Safety constraints that are not expressed in terms 
of inputs, outputs, and time have been erroneously formulated. 
The identification of the safety-critical modules is not enough. It is necessary 
to isolate and protect the safety-critical modules from the ones that are not. It is also 
desirable to minimize the number of safety-critical modules. When the detailed design 
is complete, the safety constraints become the criteria against which the design safety 
can be formally verified. The complexity of design safety verification can be reduced 
if the safety-critical modules are identified and protected from the other modules. 
Section 3.2 describes a design hazard analysis technique that identifies the 
safety-critical modules and derives their safety constraints. It presents a brute-force 
analysis technique, suggests enhancements to resolve safety constraint conflicts, and 
discusses essential requirements of a "firewall" to protect the safety-critical modules 
from the rest. Section 3.3 discusses how to verify the safety of the detailed design 
efficiently by using an incremental and selective verification technique. Section 3.4 
proposes some safe design techniques that enhance safety by reducing the possibility 
of timing-related errors and dealing with abnormal data and control errors. 
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3.2 High-Level Design Analysis 
High-level design may be conceived as consisting of successive refinement into 
a set of modules and the interactions among them. The decomposition may also 
introduce a set of internal variables (i.e., data flows). The module being decomposed 
can be completely characterized by its functional requirements FM(IM, OM, t) and the 
safety constraints CM(IM, OM, t) where IM, OM, and t denote the module's inputs 
and outputs, and time (if applicable), respectively. After allocating the functional 
requirements, it is necessary to identify the safety-critical modules and to derive their 
safety constraints. 
The decomposition can be formally represented as a directed graph where nodes 
denote the functions that the modules compute and edges denote the data-dependency 
among the modules. When a module NI is decomposed, the process of identifying the 
safety-critical modules and their safety constraints starts with the safety constraints 
of the module CM. This section proposes an analysis technique using the following 
notation: 
F( n) : Function being computed at the node n. 
source( e ), dest( e) : Source and destination node of the edge e, respectively. 
c( e) : Safety constraints associated with the edge e. If a node n has outgoing edges 
e1 , ... , ei, the module's safety constraint is defined as c( e1) /\ ... /\ c( ei)· 
3.2.1 Safety-Critical Module Identification 
Ve, c( e) := TRUE; - - initially assumed to be safety-independent 
vci loop - - for each constraint subcondition 
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OutEdges := { edges with direct impact on Ci but without dest node }; 
Ve 3 OutEdges, c(e) := c(e) /\ Ci; - - initialization 
NodesToProcess := {Ve 3 OutEdges, Vn 3 n=source(e) }; 
while ( N odesToProcess =I [ ] ) loop 
n : = { n 3 N odesToProcess}; - - select a node to analyze 
NodesToProcess := NodesToProcess - [n]; 
AnalyzeAN ode( n); 
end loop; 
end loop; 
Figure 3.2: A Brute Force Algorithm to Detect Safety-Critical Items 
Figure 3.2 shows how a brute-force backward analysis can be applied for each 
component of the safety constraints. First, the output modules that have direct im-
pact on the satisfiability of the safety constraints are identified (i.e., NodesToProcess). 
Then, backward analysis is applied to one node at a time until there are no more nodes 
to process. 
The AnalyzeANode procedure, shown in Figure 3.3, starts with the derivation 
of the weakest preconditions necessary to satisfy the safety constraints. A module 
is safety-independent if the safety constraints (i.e., post condition) and the weakest 
precondition are the same. If, on the other hand, the weakest precondition is either 
TRUE or FALSE, the analysis need not be propagated to other nodes. Otherwise, each 
component of the weakest precondition must be made true either by propagating it 
to another module as its safety constraint or by enforcing it within the module using 
run-time assertions. If the variables that constitute each component of the weakest 
precondition in conjunctive normal form are passed from another module via data 
Vj(l:::; j:::; i) 3 source(ej) = n, Cn := c(ei) !\ ... !\ c(ei); 
WP(n) :=weakest precondition, in CNF, to satisfy Cn; 
if WP(n) =FALSE then 
HALT; - - inherently unsafe, revise design, and repeat analysis 
elsif (WP(n) -/:- Cn) and (WP(n) -/:-TRUE) then 
V WPi(n) loop 
InEdges := {edges passing data used in vVPi(n)} 
if size(InEdges) = 1 then 
e := { e 3 InEdges }; 
if ( f-ln 3 n = so'Urce( e)) then - - safety-critical input assertions 
F(n) :='if WPi then F(n) else RECOVERY; end if; 
else - - data flow from another module 
c(e) := c(e) !\ WPi(n); 
if c(e) =FALSE then 
HALT; - - revise design and repeat analysis 
else 
N odesToProcess := N odesToProcess + [source( n)] 
end if; 
end if; 
else - - use run-time assertions to ensure safety 
F(n) :='if WPi(n) then F(n) else RECOVERY; end if'; 
end if; 
end loop; 
end if; 
Figure 3.3: AnalyzeANode (inn : node) 
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flow, the condition can be best enforced by the module supplying the data. Otherwise, 
the functional definition of the module needs to be augmented using assertions so that 
the safety-critical computations take place only when it is safe to do so. It should be 
emphasized that the designer should always specify the proper recovery activities to 
be invoked when the assertions do not hold. 
The brute-force approach presented above has some drawbacks. If safety con-
flicts are detected (e.g., FALSE weakest precondition), the analysis must be applied 
in entirety on a revised design. Due to the ad hoc order of applying the analysis on 
each component of the safety constraints, such conflicts may not be detected quickly. 
The enhanced algorithm, shown in Figure 3.4 through 3.8, improves the brute 
force algorithm in the following two ways: 
• The data-flow dependency (i.e., AssignNodeLevels procedure) determines the 
order of module analysis. 
• If there is a module whose current design cannot guarantee the satisfaction of 
the safety constraints, an attempt is made to substitute a functionally equivalent 
but algorithmically different design to see if the conflicts can be resolved. If not, 
the AnalyzeANode procedure returns with a flag (e.g., MustBackUp =TRUE) 
indicating the need to attempt recovery at other nodes (e.g., Undo procedure). 
The AssignNodeLevels procedure (Figure 3.5), invoked as a part of initialization, 
uses data-flow dependency and assigns a level to each node so that the levels of source 
nodes are always greater than that of the destination nodes for all the data flows. 
Backward analysis can then be applied in the ascending level order. 
The AnalyzeANode procedure (Figure 3.6) is basically the same as the one 
previously presented except that the Distribute WP procedure (Figure 3. 7) sets the 
Ve, c( e) := TRUE; - - assume safety-independence 
vci loop - - for each constraint condition 
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OutEdges := { edges with direct impact on Ci but without <lest node }; 
Ve 3 OutEdges, c(e) := c(e) /\Ci; 
end loop; 
CurLevel := 1; AssignNodeLevels (MaxLevel); - - analyze data-dependency 
OLoop: while ( CurLevel < MaxLevel) loop - - in ascending level order 
NodesToProcess := {Vn 3 level(n)=CurLevel} 
while (NodesToProcess i= []) loop 
n := { n 3 NodesToProcess }; 
NodesToProcess := NodesToProcess - [n]; 
AnalyzeANode(n, MustBackUp ); 
if (MustBackUp) then - - unsafe module detected 
Undo (n, Resolved); 
exit OLoop when ( • Resolved); - - parent substitution failed 
end if; 
end loop; 
CurLevel := CurLevel + 1; 
end loop; 
if (not Resolved) then 
HALT; - - revise design and repeat analysis 
end if; 
Figure 3.4: An Enhanced Algorithm to Detect Safety-Critical Items 
Ve 3 -,:J dest(e), level(source(e)) := 1; 
CurLevel := 1; MaxLevel := 1; 
loop 
Edges:= {Ve 3 level(dest(e))=CurLevel }; 
exit when Edges = [ ]; 
Ve 3 Edges loop 
level( source( e) ):=level( <lest( e) )+ 1; 
if level( source( e)) > MaxLevel then 
MaxLevel := level( source( e) ); 
end if; 
end loop; 
Cur Level : = Cur Level + 1; 
end loop; 
Figure 3.5: AssignNodeLevels (out MaxLevel : integer) 
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parameter Successful to FALSE upon the detection of safety constraint conflicts. In 
such cases, attempts are made if the substitution of semantically equivalent but al-
gorithmically different functions can resolve the conflicts. If not, the node returns 
the boolean flag MustBackUp to TRUE so that the analysis can be backtracked to the 
nodes that are the destination of the data flows originating from the node n. 
The Undo procedure (Figure 3.8) determines if the safety conflicts that could 
not be resolved locally can be resolved by modifying the functional definition at one of , 
the parent nodes (e.g., the destination node of data flows). Safety constraint conflicts 
are considered to be resolved if and only if backward analysis applied at the parent 
node (i.e., PN ode) and the child node (i.e., n) do not require any further backups. 
The modification of the functions at the parent node requires that backward analysis 
MustBackup := FALSE; 
Vj(l:::; j:::; i) 3 source(ej) = n, Cn := c(e1) /\ ... /\ c(ei); 
loop 
WP(n) :=weakest precondition, in CNF, to satisfy Cn; 
exit when (WP(n) = Cn) V (WP(n) =TRUE); - - ignore 
Ve 3 n=source(e), save c(e); 
DistributeWP (Successful); 
exit when Successful; 
if :3 G( n) then - - local substitution failed 
F(n) := G(n); 
else 
MustBackUp := TRUE; 
exit; 
end if; 
end loop; 
Figure 3.6: AnalyzeANode (in n : node; out MustBackUp : boolean) 
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Successful:= WP(n) =f. FALSE; 
if Successful then 
V \i\!Pi loop 
Edges := { edge supplying value used in WPi}; 
if size(Eclges) > 1 then - - data-flow from multiple modules 
F(n) :='if WPi then F(n) else RECOVERY; end if'; 
else - single data-flow source 
if ( pn 3 n = source( e)) then - - input assertion 
F(n) := 'if WPi then F(n) else RECOVERY; end if'; 
else - - another module 
c(e) := c(e) /\ WPi; 
if c(e) =FALSE then 
Ve 3 n=source( e), restore c( e); 
Successful := FALSE; 
exit; 
end if; 
end if; 
end if; 
end loop; 
end if; 
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Figure 3.7: DistributeWP (inn : node; in WP: boolean; out Successful: boolean) 
Resolved := FALSE; 
ParentNodes := { Vm 3 3e (source(e)=n) /\ (dest(e) = m)}; 
OLoop: while (not Resolved) and (ParentNodes -/= []) loop 
PNode := { m 3 ParentNodes }; 
AParent: 
ParentNodes := ParentNodes - [PNode); 
Ve 3 PNode=dest(e), save c(e); 
loop 
exit AParent when J-3 G(PNode); - - parent substitution failed 
F(Pnode) := G(PNode); 
ParentWP :=Weakest precondition for PNode; 
AnalyzeANode(PNode, MustBackup ); 
if ( 1 MustBackup) then 
AnalyzeANode(n, MustBackup); 
if ( 1 MustBackup) then 
Resolved := TRUE; 
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ChildNodes := { Vm 3 3e (source(e) = m) /\ (dest(e) = PNode)}; 
NodesToProcess := NodesToProcess + ChildNodes; 
exit OLoop; 
else 
Ve 3 PNode=dest(e), restore c(e); 
end if; 
end if; 
end loop; - - for each parent node 
end loop; - - not resolved 
Figure 3.8: Undo (in n : node; out Resolved : booelan) 
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be applied again on some child nodes because different safety constraints may be 
propagated. 
It is possible, in principle, to extend the Undo procedure so that the backtracking 
continues until either the safety constraint conflicts a.re resolved or there are no more 
modules to which one can backtrack. However, the idea. of "global" (or extensive) 
backtracking seems impractical because: 
• For a complete backtracking analysis, one must examine the various combina-
tions of functional definitions at all the modules involved. 
• Since the analysis is applied recursively at each level of decomposition, the num-
ber of modules one must analyze at a time is not expected to be large. 
The Undo procedure, therefore, halts the analysis if the substitution of various func-
tional definitions at the node and at the parent node fail to resolve the conflict. 
3.2.2 Safety-Critical Module Protection 
Once the safety-critical modules have been identified, it is important to protect 
the safety-critical items by a "firewall." The firewall allows the safety-critical modules 
to be clearly identified and reduces the effort required for safety verification. The basic 
idea behind a firewall is to restrict the interactions between the safety-critical modules 
and the safety-independent ones so that the behavior of the safety-critical modules 
can be completely determined given only their definitions. 
Security techniques can be used to implement firewalls because their goal is to 
control access to objects. Capability and access lists are general concepts used to 
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enforce access limitation in security. Rushby(50] suggested the use of kernel encapsu-
lation as a means of protecting safety-critical items. While security techniques such as 
capabilities or kernelization provide adequate means of protecting the safety-critical 
items, this dissertation proposes the use of information hiding principles(43] instead 
(Figure 3.9) because: 
• The implementation of a capability or kernel within the application is a non-
trivial task, and the implementation is subject to errors. Information hiding, 
on the other hand, does not require any implementation overhead. 
• The formal verification of the correctness of a capability or kernel is a complex 
and difficult task, but verification of information hiding is simple and can be 
provided easily by the compiler. 
To implement a firewall, data flow from the safety-independent modules to the 
safety-critical modules is prohibited. Similarly, calls from the safety-critical modules 
3.5 
to the safety-independent modules are prohibited. However. the opposite unidirec-
tional data and control flows need to be allowed. When an input triggers multiple 
outputs, some may be safety-critical while others may not. In such cases, the inputs 
should be considered safety-critical and must be processed by the safety-critical mod-
ules. A unidirectional data flow allows the safety-independent modules to access such 
inputs. When a package construct is used to group the safety-critical modules, the 
package specification must declare only the following items to be visible: 
• The variables whose values are to be passed unidirectionally to the safety-
independent modules. The safety-critical modules may assign values to these 
variables, but the safety-critical outputs must not depend on the values of these 
variables. 
• The subprograms that safety-independent modules may call. The parameter 
passing mode must be strictly limited to the out mode that is semantically 
equivalent to the unidirectional data flow. 
The strict enforcement of such restrictions, despite the potential inconvenience to the 
developers, simplifies the safety verification process and should enhance safety. 
3.3 Detailed Design Safety Verification 
After the detailed design is complete, design safety verification should be applied 
to detect errors before the coding begins. Intermediate verification requires additional 
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resources, but should simplify the safety verification of the final code. If the safety-
oriented design method presented in the previous section is employed during the high-
level design phase, the safety verification of the detailed design can be accomplished 
by proving that: 
• The safety-critical modules are protected from the others. This allows one to 
verify the safety of the entire software by analyzing the safety of 'the safety-
critical modules only. 
• Algorithmic definitions of the safety-critical modules satisfy their safety con-
straints. This dissertation proposes an incremental approach to safety verifica-
tion: sequential safety verification followed by an optional concurrency safety 
verification. 
If the safety-critical software is implemented in a sequential language, the appli-
cation of the second phase is unnecessary. Otherwise, concurrency safety verification 
is necessary, even if all the safety-critical modules are proven to be safe, because the 
concurrent execution of the individually safe modules might be unsafe. For example, 
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suppose that the safety constraints are given as (A V B) /\ ( C V D) and tha.t the 
two safety-critical modules, whose control-fl.ow graphs are shown in Figure 3.10, are 
executed concurrently. Although each module satisfies the safety constraints individ-
ually, the concurrency state ( a2 , 61 ) might fail to satisfy the safety constraints. The 
safety of the concurrency state depends on the pace of task execution, which ma.y not 
be under the programmer's control. 
3.3.1 Firewall Adequacy Verification 
Verifying the firewall's adequacy shows that the interactions among the safety-
critical and safety-independent modules have no effect on the semantic behavior of 
the safety-critical modules. The firewall adequacy verification for a block structured 
language such as Ada can be accomplished by determining satisfaction of the following 
static criteria: 
• The safety-critical and the safety-independent modules have no variables that 
are visible to both of them except those specifically declared for the purpose 
of unidirectional data flows. Furthermore, the values of the variables used for 
data fl.ow should never be used in determining the values of the safety-critical 
outputs. 
• The safety-critical modules may not call any safety-independent modules. When 
the safety-independent modules call the safety-critical modules, the actual pa-
rameters should not violate the unidirectional data fl.ow rules. The prohibition 
of in -type or in out -type parameters in such calls guarantees the absence of 
side-effects .. 
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3.3.2 Design Safet~ Verification: Sequential Phase 
Design hazard analysis, as described above, identifies the safety constraints CM 
and the desired weakest preconditions wp(RM, CM) for each safety-critical module 
based on its functional requirements RM. Sequential safety verification on the detailed 
design attempts to prove that the detailed algorithmic definitions of module FM satisfy 
these constraints. 
The verification can be performed in either a forward or backward manner. 
Forward analysis attempts to prove that all the states reachable from the known 
initial state are safe. Using the desired weakest precondition, wp(RM, CM), as the 
initial condition, the postcondition R can be derived (e.g., { wp(RM, CM)} FM { R} ). 
The module is safe in a sequential execution environment if and only if R is logically 
equivalent to or a "stronger" condition than the safety constraints (e.g., R =} CM)· 
Forward analysis, however, becomes impractical if there are a large number of states 
to consider. 
Backward analysis, on the other hand, starts with the safety constraints as the 
initial condition. The weakest precondition derived based on the detailed module 
design, wp(FM, CM), can then be compared against the desired weakest precondition 
wp(RM, CM)· The module is safe, when executed sequentially, if and only if the 
predicate 
evaluates to TRUE. 
When backward sequential module safety verification is performed, not all the 
computational steps within the safety-critical modules need analysis. Nor do their 
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results (e.g., intermediate c?nditions leading to the module's weakest precondition) 
need to be saved for use in subsequent concurrency verification. Only the compu-
tations that cause the intermediate weakest preconditions to be changed need to be 
saved. Additionally, the statements that deal with concurrency, such as entry calls 
or rendezvous points, need to be saved so that correct concurrency safety verification 
may be performed. 
3.3.3 Design Safety Verification: Concurrency Phase 
While past software designs were predominantly sequential, the use of concur-
rent designs is increasing. Concurrency is advantageous when a natural and logically 
concise solution can be developed. However, concurrency decisions on safety-critical 
software must be based on careful trade-off analysis because: 
• The run-time overhead of creating and managing tasks is significant. Such run-
time overhead, in some hard real-time systems, _may cause failures due to missed 
deadlines or even safety hazards. 
• The complexity may increase due to the various ways tasks may communicate. 
Some rendezvous may result in hazardous states, but exhaustive verification is 
usually impractical. 
• The application of concurrent software verification techniques is likely to be 
more expensive and prone to errors than the sequential counterparts. 
Where the use of concurrency in safety-critical software design can be justified, 
a safety-oriented design method must provide a technique to verify the safety of 
concurrent design efficiently. This dissertation proposes that the use of concurrency 
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in safety-critical software design be limited only to the cases where software must 
simultaneously control logically distinct subsystems. Therefore, the decision to use 
concurrency must be made early in the design phase, and the subsequent refinements 
must proceed sequentially. 
Concurrency safety verification proves that the concurrent execution of the mod-
ules that are proven to be safe in the sequential execution environment is also safe. 
Since concurrency safety verification is a form of static analysis, the following as-
sumptions are often needed to enable or to simplify the analysis[35]: 
• Arrays of tasks are not allowed, and at most a fixed number of tasks are active 
simultaneously. 
• Tasks do not share variables (e.g., no race conditions). 
While the former is an inherent limitation of any static analysis technique, the latter 
simplifies the analysis by forcing the tasks to communicate only by explicit rendezvous 
and eliminates the possibility of side-effects. 
While it is possible, as noted by Long and Clarke[35], to extend the analysis 
technique to handle side-effects, the techniques become more complicated and less 
efficient due to the introduction of nondeterminism. Development of software tools 
to (fully or partly) automate the analysis becomes more costly. More importantly, 
analysis results themselves could be subject to more errors. The possibility of erro-
neous analysis cannot be ignored for safety-critical software design. Therefore, one 
must carefully evaluate the trade-offs between the restricted design activities that re-
quire relatively simple verification procedures and the unrestricted and flexible design 
activities that require more sophisticated (and potentially more erroneous) verifica-
tion procedures. It is almost always wiser to choose the former unless the restrictions 
I 
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are too severe to prevent designers from developing understandable and maintainable 
designs. This is especially true for the design of safety-critical software. 
A straightforward approach to concurrency safety verification generates all the 
feasible combinations of the critical states and proves that the safety constraints are 
satisfied in all the concurrency states. There a.re two functionally equivalent meth-
ods of determining the feasible concurrency states. The first method starts from 
the known initial concurrency state and identifies all the concurrency states that are 
reachable (e.g., concurrency graph[52], Petri Net reachability graph[45], or task in-
teraction graph[35]). The second method first generates all possible combinations of 
component states regardless of their reachability (e.g., the Kleene star operator in 
constrained expression formalism[2]). The pruning process is then followed to elimi-
nate the infeasible concurrency states. The rendezvous points, which must have been 
introduced to fulfill the functional requirements, serve as a pruning tool. The pruning 
allows one to achieve the effect of applying the shuffle operator in the constrained 
expression formalism. The satisfiability of the safety constraints at each concurrency 
state can then be determined by serializing the concurrent execution into the list of 
feasible sequential executions. However, this brute-force analysis is impractical due 
to the enormous number of serial executions that must be analyzed. 
An efficient concurrency safety verification technique has been developed based 
on the following argument: 
• Concurrency safety verification can be achieved by proving that all the reachable 
concurrency states satisfy the safety constraints (e.g., the bruce-force technique 
described above). Or, one can accomplish the same objective by proving that 
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there are no concurrency states that lead to the violation of the safety con-
straints. 
• Unlike the sequential safety analysis where all the safety-critical modules must 
be analyzed, only the safety-critical modules that could be executed concur-
rently with other safety-critical modules (henceforth called "concurrent safety-
critical modules") need to be analyzed in concurrency safety verification. 
• Even some of the statements setting the safety constraint conditions to false 
within the concurrent safety-critical modules can be ignored because not all 
the safety constraints a.re subject to violation during concurrent execution. 
Therefore, only the safety constraints that are subject to violation in the con-
current execution environment need to be analyzed, and only the statements 
setting such safety constraint conditions to false need to be examined. 
Suppose, for example, that the safety constraint the concurrent modules must 
satisfy is given as (A V B) /\ ( C V D) and that the modules have the control-flow 
graph shown in Figure 3.11. The initial and final states of the tasks are represented as 
a1 and b1 and as an and bn, respectively. The states ai, aj, and bk change the value of 
the safety constraint C as indicated. The potential rendezvous points are represented 
as r al, r a2, and r a3 for task A and as rb1 and rb2 for task B. The rendezvous points 
(1) and (2) represent the synchronization of task A at states ra1 and ra3 , respectively, 
with task Bat state rbl· Rendezvous points (3) and (4) represent the rendezvous at 
the states r a 2 and rb2, respectively. The condition C remains false between the states 
ai through aj for the task A. The concurrency states that include any of states ai 
/ 
through aj as their members could possibly fail to satisfy the safety constraints, and 
these states are collectively referred to as "impacted concurrency states." 
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The scope of the impacted concurrency states depends on the formulation of 
the safety constraints themselves and the placement of the rendezvous points among 
the concurrent modules. The term "complementary conditions" is used to refer to 
the conditions that can still satisfy the safety constraints regardless of the current 
values of some other conditions. If, for example, the safety constraints are given 
as (A V B) /\ ( C V D) , the conditions A and B are complementary conditions 
in that the safety constraints can be satisfied by either (or both) of the conditions 
being TRUE. Similarly, the conditions C and D are the complementary conditions. 
Representing the safety constraints in the conjunctive normal form clearly reveals 
the complementary conditions. If, on the other hand, the safety constraints were 
(A V B) /\ C, there is no complementary condition to C, and setting C to false 
would always cause the safety constraints to be violated. 
Similarly, the rendezvous might reduce the size of the impacted concurrency 
states. These rendezvous points might have been introduced to fulfill the functional 
requirements of the module or as a safe design technique during the sequential module 
safety verification. For the control-flow graph shown in Figure 3.11, the impacted 
concurrency states are ( ai .. a j, b1 .. bn) in the absence of any rendezvous. Rendezvous 
point (1), however, prevents states b1 through rb1 (excluding the boundary state 
rb1 ) from being affected by the event of setting C to FALSE at ai. Accordingly, the 
impacted concurrency states are reduced to ( ai··aj, rbl··bn)· The rendezvous point (2) 
similarly limits the impacted concurrency states to (ai··aj, b1 .. rb1 ). 
However, not all rendezvous points are effective in reducing the size of impacted 
concurrency states. Rendezvous points (3) and ( 4) are such examples. They are 
ineffective for either of the following reasons: 
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• The rendezvous occurs at the state where the safety invariant conditions remain 
FALSE. 
• The rendezvous occurs only on one path or a limited number of paths in the 
concurrent modules. Therefore, it is possible for the rendezvous not to occur. 3 
If the analysis reveals that there are some impacted concurrency states that 
fail to satisfy the safety constraints, assertions or rendezvous can be introduced as 
appropriate. Assertions are used to provide further constraints on executing the 
safety-critical statements so that they are executed only when their safety can be 
guaranteed not only in the sequential but also in the concurrent execution environ-
ment. Rendezvous points are used as a means of controlling the pace of task execu-
tions so that the concurrency states that violate the safety constraints can never occur 
in the absence of abnormal control-flow errors. If the assertions or rendezvous points 
are unable to guarantee the satisfaction of the safety constraints at some impacted 
concurrency states, the design must be revised. 
The traditional concurrency analysis techniques would have required the gener-
ation and analysis of a large number of concurrency states that either have nothing to 
do with safety or that can never possibly cause the safety constraints to be violated. 
However, incremental safety analysis allows the analysis to focus only on statements 
that have direct impact on safety in the concurrent execution environment. 
3 The possibility of task deadlocks due to the absence of the expected rendezvous is a different 
issue. While it is possible for hazardous states to occur consequently, the standard deadlock detection 
techniques would reveal such possibilities. 
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3.4 Some Safe Design Techniques 
While the rigorous application of the safety-oriented design method presented 
in the previous section should prevent hazardous states from occurring, the hazardous 
states still may occur due to: 
• Timing errors. 
• Generation of software outputs in an incorrect order. 
• Abnormal data and control flow errors. 
This section proposes some safe design techniques to reduce or control these prob-
lems. Section 3.4.1 explains how the possibility of timing errors can be reduced. 
Section 3.4.2 recommends the use of software interlocks to ensure the correctness 
of outputs. Section 3.4.3 shows a simple redundancy technique using programming 
language constructs that can detect or tolerate data and control flow errors. 
3.4.1 Timing Errors 
Timing analysis on software requirements has received some attention in the 
past few years. For example, timing analysis techniques on the requirements have 
been developed by Jahanian and Mok[22, 23]. Since the design may introduce timing 
errors, it is desirable to verify the timing aspect of the design, too. However, timing 
analysis on the software design is more difficult than the analysis on the requirements 
or the code. 
Timing analysis at the requirements level is feasible because the requirements 
address the "what" aspect of software rather than "how." That is, each activity 
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specified in the requirements can be modeled as either an atomic or composite activity. 
Timing information on atomic activity is assumed known or can be specified. Timing 
information on composite activities can be derived from that of the atomic activities 
and their relationships. Therefore, for timing analysis on requirements, one need not 
worry if an atomic action can be completed within the deadline; in fact, the analysis 
starts with the assumption that it will be completed within its deadline. 
Similarly, timing analysis on the source code is feasible because the source code 
represents a concrete representation of the system being developed. Furthermore, 
the source code can be compiled easily into lower level languages whose upper bound 
on the execution time is known[l5). Therefore, maximum response time can be de-
termined by analyzing the module through all the feasible paths. If computation 
involves loops with an indefinite number of iterations, no definite upper bound on 
execution time can be derived. Watchdog timers, however, can be added to detect 
timing errors at runtime. 
On the other hand, no matter how detailed the design, it is an abs.tract stat~­
ment of "_how" software fulfills "what" is required. If the same design documents 
are distributed to different programmers (or programming teams), it is reasonable 
to expect different implementations to have different characteristics. For example, 
the same operation (e.g., sorting) could be implemented using different algorithms. 
Even if the algorithm is specified in the design documents (e.g., quick sort), differ-
ent implementations almost always exhibit different timing behavior. Therefore, it 
is possible that some implementations satisfy the timing requirements while others 
do not. These factors are essential in performing meaningful timing analysis but are 
still unknown at the design phase, making timing analysis very difficult (if possible 
at all). 
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However, there are m_easures designers can take to reduce the possibility of 
hazards due to timing errors. Hazardous states may occur if the required response 
occurs either too soon or too late. This includes the possibility of required events never 
occurring. If an event is hazardous when it occurs too soon, the designer can tighten 
the trigger conditions (e.g., require additional confirmation). If, however, the event is 
hazardous when it occurs too late, the designer can relax the trigger conditions (e.g., 
provide an alternative source for the trigger conditions) so that timing errors occur 
only when there are multiple errors in all the trigger conditions. Suppose, for example, 
that the gate movement at a train crossing has been computerized. Hazardous states 
occur with either of the following: 
• The gate is not lowered before the train arrives at the crossing. 
• The gate is raised before the train leaves the crossing. 
The possibility of the former can be reduced by installing multiple sensors to de-
tect train movement. While multiple sensors increase the possibility of erroneously 
lowering the gate when the sensors fail, these failures do not compromise safety. 
Equivalently, a separate routine to issue the gate movement command could ensure 
that the gate movement is delayed no more than the predefined period of time once 
a train approaching the crossing is detected. The possibility of the latter can be 
reduced by raising the gate only when separate sensors confirm that the train has left 
the crossing. 
3.4.2 Unsafe Output Sequences 
Software mishaps can occur not only from inherently unsafe software outputs 
but from an unsafe sequence of outputs. Suppose, for example, the generation of the 
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successive outputs 0 A imm~diately followed by OB is unsafe and that the generation 
of the intermediate output Or is needed to ensure safety. Software interlocks pro-
vide an effective means of enforcing the desired output sequences, and they can be 
implemented easily by modifying the output trigger conditions. If the trigger con-
dition functionally required for the output OB is denoted CB, one can "strengthen" 
the trigger condition to be I /\ CB where I is the interlock condition. The output 
sequencing can be accomplished if the interlock condition I, initially set to TRUE, is 
set to FALSE after the generation of the output 0 A. Setting the interlock condition 
to TRUE only after the generation of the required intermediate output 01 guarantees 
that the output 0 A is never immediately followed by OB without the required output 
01 in between. The interlock conditions, however, do not block the output OB from 
being generated if the preceding output is not 0 A. 
3.4.3 Abnormal Data and Control Errors 
Another issue that must be addressed in developing high-quality safety-critical 
software is that of the programming language constructs. Programming languages 
impact productivity as well as safety. If the implementation language does not sup-
port the concepts used in the design, the program becomes longer, more expensive 
to develop, and less reliable. This section proposes some programming language con-
structs that are useful in preventing and detecting abnormal data and control errors. 
Data errors occur when incorrect values are assigned to the variables. Data er-
rors, almost always the result of design (logic) errors, can be detected using the safety 
verification technique proposed earlier. However, data errors may occur abnormally; 
environmental stress or hardware failures may cause data errors[l 7]. One such type 
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of stress occurs when a bit of memory holding the variable is toggled unexpectedly 
when a gamma ray hits the memory cells hard enough to cause a change. Any un-
expected modification of these variables can be detected (or tolerated if desired) by 
using redundancy (e.g., allocate the variable at two or three distinct memory loca-
tions). Data redundancy is hardly a new idea. For example, the VAXft 3000, the first 
fault-tolerant VAX computer, comes with a layered product called a volume shadow-
ing server4 • The users can create a shadow set that consist of up to three disks, and 
the shadow server software guarantees the data integrity among the redundant data 
through multiple updates and voting upon data retrieval. 
Selective data redundancy capability can also be provided by the programming 
language if users are allowed to declare the safety attribute of variables along with 
their data types. 
procedure monitor_patient is 
age : integer; - - default (safety independent) 
blood_pressure : critical integer; 
This relieves the programmer of the burden of designing software that can cope with 
its own failures due to abnormal data errors. However, the designer need not manually 
identify all the safety-critical variables because the compiler can identify all the safety-
critical variables through static data dependency analysis ·based on the declaration of 
the safety-critical software outputs. While the implementation of data redundancy 
requires additional resources, it is a simple and effective solution to potentially serious 
software failures that are difficult to handle in software. 
4 Volume shadowing is DEC's terminology for data redundancy. 
.51 
Control errors refer to the cases where the program (or module) execution occurs 
due to the execution of an incorrect path. This often occurs due to logic errors (e.g., 
an incorrect branch condition), and the safety verification technique discussed earlier 
should detect such errors. Abnormal data errors may also cause control errors. For 
example, a data error in the program counter register or the variables used in branch 
condition evaluation results in control errors. These types of errors can be either 
detected or tolerated using the safety attributes proposed above. 
An alternative is the use of batons[.5.5]. The basic idea is to determine the desired 
control flow of the module and to assign a unique identifier to each place in the graph. 
The baton is an internal variable that gets passed from place to place and modified. 
Each place compares the baton values against its list of potential values and detects 
the occurrence of abnormal control flow errors. The overhead of the baton, due to the 
runtime comparison and modification of the baton variable, can be kept reasonable 
if the compiler allows the technique to be limited to the safety-critical modules only. 
Chapter 4 
A Safety-Oriented Management 
Structure 
Software project management techniques are very important due to their di-
rect and significant impact on software quality. This is also true of their impact on 
safety. As Leveson points out in her survey paper(27], "the degree of safety achieved 
in a system depends directly on management emphasis," and the development of 
high-quality safety-critical software is unlikely without management's recognition of 
the seriousness of the software safety problems and its commitment of adequate re-
sources. Management needs to be aware of the effectiveness and the costs of potential 
approaches to software safety so that a wise decision can be made about how the re-
sources are to be spent. 
Software project management is a very broad subject that covers topics such as 
planning, organizing, staffing, directing, and controlling[4 7]. This chapter addresses 
the project management issues that are unique to software and system safety. 
4.1 Software Safety Management 
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Figure 4.1: Safety Management Hierarchy Recommended in the MoD-Std-0055 
Figure 4.1 shows the organizational structure recommended by the UK software 
safety standard. It consists of a project manager, design authority, independent 
software safety assessor (ISSA), an independent verification and validation (IV & V) 
team, and a number of advisors assisting the project manager. The parties whose 
approval is required in issuing the software safety certification are shown in dashed 
boxes. The standard specifies the safety responsibilities as follows: 
• The project manager, acting as the safety authority, bears the ultimate respon-
sibility for software development and its safety. 
• The design authority, appointed by the project manager, appoints the ISSA and 
the IV&V team. The primary responsibility of the design authority is safety 
management which includes the following: 
- Safety plan preparation. The safety plan is prepared at the beginning of 
each phase and requires the project manager's approval. The plan provides 
54 
a detailed description of safety goals and the means of accomplishing such 
goals. 
Safety log maintenance. The safety log, main depository of information 
related to safety, contains documents on review results, formal correctness 
and safety proofs, hazard analysis results, etc. 
Software design and verification. The design authority carries out high-
level design analysis by identifying the safety-critical modules and by iso-
lating them. The design authority also conducts formal correctness and 
safety verification on the detailed design and the code. 
• The ISSA, independent from the design authority, audits and reviews all activ-
ities and documents involved in safety-critical software development. 
• The IV & V team, independent of the design team, checks the correctness of the 
design and proofs. The results are recorded in the safety log. 
• A number of advisors and authorities assist the project manager and the design 
authority on various subjects. For example, the safety assurance advisor "ad-
vises the project manager on all safety matters." This includes the assessment 
of the work by the design authority and the ISSA. 
Figure 4.2 proposes a slightly different hierarchy where the ISSA is appointed 
and supervised directly by the project manager - not by the design authority.· The 
advantages of this include: 
• The elimination of a redundant position. 
The role of safety assurance advisor, assessing the work of the design 
authority and the ISSA, may seem reasonable as providing yet another 
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Figure 4.2: Slight Variation to Mod-StD-0055 Management Hierarchy 
level of "defensive line" against software mishaps. However, one of the 
most fundamental management principles is that excessively redun-
dant positions reduce productivity due to increased communication 
overhead. 
The revised structure eliminates the position of the safety assurance 
advisor by having the ISSA and the IV&V team advise the project 
manager and the design authority, respectively, on safety matters. 
• Managerial independence. 
The standard recognizes the importance of technical as well as man-
agerial independence of the ISSA from the design authority. Having 
the ISSA appointed and supervised directly by the project manager 
ensures (or at least enhances) managerial independence from the de-
sign authority. 
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• Reduced load on design authority. 
The standard explicitly requires the design authority to be respon-
sible for safety management. Consequently, the design authority is 
responsible for an overwhelmingly large number of tasks as detailed in 
Annex B of the standard. Some tasks (e.g., safety log maintenance) 
require administrative skills while others require technical skills (e.g., 
software hazard analysis, safety-oriented software design, etc). While 
this heavy concentration of responsibilities allows the design authority 
to control software development, it may result in a negative impact 
on software safety. Furthermore, finding people who possess both 
administrative and technical talents can be difficult. 
Therefore, it is best to separate the technical and managerial aspects 
of software safety responsibility. The technical aspects can be per-
formed by the design authority whose role is similar to that of the chief 
programmer[40], and the administrative aspects can be performed by 
the project manager. 
• Lower turnover rates. 
The standard notes that the person acting as the design authority may 
vary from phase to phase (e.g., due to staff turnovers or individual 
specialties). It is naive to expect no staff turnovers during develop-
ment, but it is reasonable to expect lower staff turnover rates among 
the positions with greater responsibility. Software safety is more likely 
to receive the continuous attention it deserves if the responsibility of 
the actual safety management is shifted to a higher-ranking authority. 
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4.2 System Safety Management 
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A generalization of the safety-oriented software management hierarchy to in-
elude system safety is proposed in Figure 4.3. It recommends the appointment of 
a system safety manager who is responsible for the verification of both system and 
software safety. Since software safety is a system property, the ISSA can be appointed 
and supervised by the system safety manager. 
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The system engmeenng authority a.nd the system safety manager should be 
responsible for the early phases of system development (i.e., the system requirements 
specification and system design). The system engineering authority develops the 
system requirements, performs the preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), and allocates 
the system requirements to subsystems. Upon the submission of the system design for 
approval, the system safety manager should review the work of the system engineering 
authority and make a recommendation on its safety to the system project manager. 
Software safety responsibilities should be similarly allocated. The software de-
sign authority is responsible for the validation of the logical completeness and safety 
of the requirements specification. The IV & V team should independently validate 
the work of the software design authority. The software design phase, however, only 
begins when the software engineering manager gives a formal approval to the inde-
pendent safety verification by the ISSA. The software design authority performs the 
design hazard analysis and verifies the detailed design safety as presented in this dis-
sertation. The ISSA provides an independent recommendation on software design 
safety to the software engineering manager who formally approves the completion of 
the design phase. The same process is repeated in the coding phase. 
The software engineering manager aids the software design authority by assum-
ing responsibilities on document and configuration controls. This allows the software 
design authority to devote his or her efforts to the technical aspects of the project. 
However, the software design authority must be kept informed about the documen-
tation and configuration changes. The project manager should maintain the safety 
log as well. A software librarian could be hired if necessary to keep the load of the 
software engineering manager at a reasonable level. 
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Upon the completion ?f software development, the system quality assurance 
manager performs system integration and makes a recommendation to the system 
project manager on its acceptance. The system safety manager must perform the 
safety verification of the integrated system and certify the system safety. The system 
project manager, based upon these recommendations, accepts the system and certifies 
its safety. 
Chapter 5 
A TCAS Example 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes an application of the safety-oriented design method de-
scribed in Chapter 3. It is demonstrated using the threat detection subsystem of the 
TCAS II (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System) software design. A Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) publication[l] provides the best and most concise 
description of the goals and the basic designs for the TCAS II. The complete descrip-
tion of the detailed CAS logic is published by the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics (RTCA) [49]. 
TCAS, a family of airborne devices that function independently of the ground-
based air traffic control system, provide collision avoidance protection for a broad 
spectrum of aircraft types. TCAS is based on the concept of range/range rate (tau) 
which defines time-to-go, rather than distance-to-go, to the closest point of approach. 
TCAS II provides traffic advisories and resolution advisories (i.e., recommended es-
cape maneuvers) in a vertical direction to avoid conflicting traffic. Effective CAS 
logic operation requires a trade-off between necessary protection and unnecessary 
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Figure 5.1: CAS Logic Functions 
advisories. Controlling the sensitivity level (SL) changes the dimensions of the pro-
tected air space around each TCAS-equipped aircraft. A higher SL provides better 
protection but also increases the probability of unnecessary alerts. 
The logic functions used by TCAS II to perform the collision avoidance task are 
shown in Figure 5.1. The surveillance data on the 'ownn and intruder aircraft are 
processed by the "Tracking" subsystem which creates the intruder track file (ITF). 
The "Threat Detection" subsystem searches the list of intruders and identifies the 
threats about which the traffic or resolution advisories are issued. The "Resolution 
1The aircraft the TCAS must protect is referred to as 'own' while any other aircraft is called the 
'intruder'. 
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Advisory" subsystem coordinates the recommended maneuvers to avoid collision with 
other TCAS-equipped aircraft and displays the resolution advisories to the pilots. 
Because of the complexity of the complete TCAS II design, the example in 
this dissertation is limited only to the Threat-Detection subsystem. The threats are 
identified by performing range and altitude tests on every altitude-reporting intruder. 
The intruders are declared a threat when both the range and the altitude tests are 
passed. However, the threat declaration may be delayed, even if the intruder passes 
both tests, depending on the geometry of the encounter and the quality and length 
of the vertical track data. 
The PDL descriptions used in this chapter are slightly different from the one 
published by the RTCA in the TCAS Minimum Operational Performance Standards 
(MOPS). The differences are: 
• Track-Firmness-Test. This procedure examines the quality and length of the 
vertical track data to determine if the threat declaration should be delayed even 
if the intruder passes both the range and the altitude criteria. While the RTCA 
design invokes the Track-Firmness-Test only when the intruder passes the range 
and the altitude tests, the modified PDL first invokes the Track-Firmness-Test 
to see if the application of the the range and altitude tests are needed2 • 
• Concurrency. The RTCA design is strictly sequential. To illustrate the appli-
cation of the method on concurrent designs, the modified PDL performs the 
range and altitude tests as tasks. 
2The modification is intended to simplify the complexity of backward analysis. However, the 
modified design is more efficient than the RTCA design when a large number of intruders pass both 
the range and altitude test but fail the Track-Firmness-Test which makes them non-threatening. 
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• Notation. The RTCA design uses record structures extensively. For example, 
information related to an intruder is stored in an IT F record while the system 
parameters and the global variables are stored in the P and G records, respec-
tively. Because unique field names are in the design, the modified PDL omits 
the record names. 
• Algorithmic Simplification. Computational definitions of the various tests (e.g., 
altitude tests, tau computations, etc.) have been slightly simplified to make 
the example self-contained. This also enhances the understandability of the 
example by non-TCAS experts. 
e· Intruder Logging. The display of the intruder information on the pilot console 
is safety-critical because incorrect information may make a pilot issue a poten-
tially hazardous command. Since all the modules within the Threat-Detection 
subsystem of the RTCA design are safety-critical, a safety-independent module 
logging the intruder information for post-flight analysis is introduced. 
5.2 TCAS Design Description 
The procedures Threat-Detection and Setup-Parameters are shown in Figure 5.2. 
An intruder is declared a hit when the results of the tests (i.e., firm, zhi t, and rhi t) 
are TRUE. The Setup-Parameters procedure initializes the following parameters: 
tvpcmd: Max tau for vertical miss distance (VMD) calculation. 
h1: Range-range rate hyperbola threshold. 
trthr: Range tau threshold. 
tvthr: Time-to-coaltitude threshold. 
procedure Threat-Detection; 
begin 
Setup-Parameters; 
hitflg := FALSE; 
Track-Firmness-Test (firm); 
if (firm) then 
Hit-or-Miss-Test ( zhi t, r hit); 
hitflg := zhit /\ rhit; 
if hitflg then 
Log-Threat-Info; 
end if; 
end if; 
end Threat-Detection; 
procedure Setup-Parameters; 
tvpcmd : = tvpct bl (lev); - - lev = max (index, plint) 
hl := hltbl (lev); 
if (itf.eqp = $TCAS) then 
trthr : = trtet bl(lev); tvthr : = tvtet bl(lev); 
else 
trthr := trtutbl(lev); tvthr := tvtutbl (lev); 
end if; 
end Setup-Parameters; 
Figure 5.2: Procedures Threat-Detection and Setup-Parameters 
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procedure Hit-or-Miss-Test (out zhit, rhit : boolean); 
begin 
Hit-Test- Ini t; 
Compute-Tau (taur, trtru); 
Compute-VMD-HDM (vmd, hmd); 
Run-Altitude-Range-Test (zhit, rhit); 
encl Hit-or-Miss-Test; 
procedure Hit-Test-Init; 
rz := zown - zint; 
rzd := zclown - zdint; 
a:= jrzj; 
aclot : = rzcl * sign ( zdint); 
rdtemp := rd; 
if (rd 2:: - rel thr) then 
rcltemp := - rdthr; 
encl Hit-Test-Init; 
Figure 5.3: Procedures Hit-Or-Miss-Test and Hit-Test-Init 
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The values of these parameters are based on the higher of the sensitivity levels between 
the own and intruder aircraft. Once the parameters are decided, the Track-Firmness-
Test examines the length and quality of the vertical tracking data. Upon passing the 
Track-Firmness-Test, the Hit-or-Miss-Test evaluates the range and the altitude tests 
in parallel. 
The Hit-or-Miss-Test (Figure 5.3) performs its own initialization, calculates the 
tau values, calculates the vertical and horizontal miss distances, and invokes the range 
and the altitude test. The Hit-Test-Init procedure initializes the following: 
rz: Relative altitude (i.e., own altitude minus intruder altitude). 
procedure Compute-Tau is 
begin 
tauv := - adot; 
trtru := max (mintau, - dt r ); - - true tau 
r emp 
if (r > 0) then 
r_dmod2 
taur := - r 
rd temp 
else 
taur := mintau; 
end if; 
taur :=max (mintau, taur); - - modified tau 
end Compute-Tau; 
Figure 5.4: Procedure Compute-Tau 
rzd: Relative altitude rate. 
a: Absolute value of the relative altitude. 
adot: Signed value of relative altitude rate. 
-------- ----------
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rdtemp: Temporary variable for tau calculation (i.e., either tracked range rate rd or 
the negation of the system threshold on range rate rdthr). 
The Compute-Tau procedure (Figure 5.4) determines the values of the true 
and modified tau, trtru and taur, respectively. TCAS uses the modified tau taur 
because simulations have shown that an intruder with slow horizontal or vertical 
closure rate can become dangerously close without crossing the true tau boundary[l]. 
The modified tau declares such intruders as threats earlier than the true tau can. 
procedure Compute-V11ID-HMD is 
begin 
hmd := r + rd * tauv; 
vmdl := rz + rzd * min (tvpcmd, trtru); 
vmd2 := rz + rzd * min (tvpcmd, taur); 
if ( vmdl * vmd2 ~ 0) then 
vmd := O; 
elsif ( vmdl > 0) then 
vmd :=min (vmdl, vmd2); 
else 
vmd :=max (vmdl, vmd2); 
end if; 
end Compute-VMD-HMD; 
Figure 5.5: Procedure Compute-VMD-HMD 
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The Compute-V.MD-HMD procedure (Figure 5.5) determines the vertical and 
horizontal miss distances using the tau values supplied by the Compute-Tau proce-
<lure. The algorithmic definitions of the Range-Test and Altitude-Test tasks involve 
the examination of the encounter geometries as shown in Figure 5.6. The Log-Threat-
Info procedure (Figure 5. 7) is provide to assist data analysis after the flight. 
5.3 TCAS Safety Analysis 
Figure 5.8 shows the structure of the Threat-Detection procedure and data 
flows. Suppose that the safety requirements specify that the intruder located inside 
the protected airspace be declared a threat. The initial safety constraints can be 
procedure Run-Altitude-Range-Test (out zhit, rhit : boolean); 
task body Range-Test is 
begin 
if (rd > rdthr) V (taur ~ trthr) V (r > rmax) then 
rhit := (r ~ dmod) /\ (Ir* rdl ~ hl); 
else 
rhit :=TRUE 
end if; 
end Range-Test; 
task body Altitude-Test is 
begin 
zhit := FALSE; 
if (a < zthr) then 
zhit := lvmdl < zdthr; 
els if ( adot < zd thr) then 
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zhit := (tauv < tvthr) /\ ( lvmdl< zthr V (ihmdl< dmod /\ tauv < trtru) ); 
end if; 
end Altitude-Test; 
begin 
end Run-Range-Altitude-Test; 
Figure 5.6: Procedure Run-Range-Altitude-Test 
procedure Log-Threat-Info is 
begin 
- - append the following threat info to the end of threat-log-file 
seek (threat-log-file, eof); 
save 1TF .ID, taur, trtru, vmd, hmd, time-of-day 
end Log-Threat-Info; 
Figure 5.7: Procedure Log-Threat-Info 
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r ,rd,dmod,rdthr ,zthr 
Threat-Detection 
* 
Setup-Parameters 
tvpcmd,hl, trthr, tvthr 
Hit-or-Miss-Test 
r 
Hit-Test-Ini t 
rz,rzd,a,adot 
Compute-Tau 
taur, trtru, tauv 
Compute-VMD-HMD 
vmd, hmd 
' Run-Al ti tu de-Range-Test 
Range-Test Altitude-Test 
rhit zhit 
y 
t hitfl g 
Figure 5.8: Structure of Threat-Detection Procedure 
Setup-Parameters 
I 
Track-Firmness-Test(firm) 
Hit-or-Miss-Test ( zhi t, r hit); 
(r 2 dmod V I rd 121 rdthr I V zhit) /\ 
(r 2 dmod V I rd 121 rdthr I V rhit) 
hitfig := zhit /\ rhit 
(r 2 dmod) V (I rd 121 rdthr I) V hitflg 
if hitfig then Log-Threat-Info; 
Safety Constraints 
(r 2 dmod) V (I rd 121 rdthr I) 
hitfig := false 
(r 2 dmod) V (I rd 121 rdthr I) V hitflg 
Figure 5.9: Control Flow of Threat-Detection Procedure 
formally specified as: 
(r < dmod) A (I rd 1<1 rdthr I) -+ hitflg 
(r 2 dmod) V (I rd 121 rdthr I) V hitflg 
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where hitflg is the output (i.e. TRUE means a threat) and the others are the inputs.3 
Figure 5.9 shows how backward analysis is applied on the Threat-Detection pro-
cedure where the initial safety constraints and the intermediate weakest preconditions 
3Dmod is actually a local variable within the Threat-Detection procedure in the RTCA design. Its 
value is Dmodtbl (lev) where lev is the maximum of the sensitivity level of the own and intruder 
aircraft. 
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are shown in italics. Backward analysis reveals that the Log-Threat-Info procedure 
is safety-independent because the weakest precondition is the same as the safety con-
straints. The procedure requires access to variables such as the intruder ID that we 
assume are available, the values of the true and the modified tau, and the vertical 
and horizontal miss distances. If any of these variables turn out to be safety-critical, 
they must be protected by a firewall so that the Log-Threat-Info procedure may not 
modify their values accidently. 
The safety constraints of the Run-Range-Altitude-Test procedure are: 
(r 2:: dmod V I rd 12::1 rdthr I V rhit) !\ (r 2:: dmod V I rd 12::1 rdthr I V zhit) 
Therefore, the safety constraints of the Range-Test and the Altitude-Test become 
(r 2:: dmod V I rd 12::1 rdthr I V rhit) and (r 2:: dmod V I rd 12::1 rdthr I V zhit), re-
spectively. 
Figure 5.10 shows the continued application of backward analysis to the Range-
Test task that results in the following weakest precondition: 
(r 2:: dmod) V (I rd 12::1 rdthr I) V 
(I r * rd I :::; hl) !\ ( r :::; dmod) V 
(rd :::; rdthr !\ taur < trthr !\ r :::; rmax) 
The weakest precondition, given in disjunctive normal form, can be regarded as 
having several lines of defense toward the satisfaction of the safety constraints. For 
example, the truth of the predicate c1 
(r 2:: dmod) V (I rd 12::1 rdthr I) 
is based only on the input values. If the condition c1 is TRUE, the Range-Test task is 
safe in a sequential execution environment in the absence of abnormal data or control 
Weakest Precondition 
(r 2 dmod) V (I rd 121 rdthr I) V 
(Ir* rd I::; hl /\ r::; dmod) V 
(rd::; rdthr /\ taur < trthr /\ r ::; rmax) 
(r 2 dmod) V (I rd 121 rdthr I) V 
(Ir* rd 1::; hl /\ r::; dmod) 
rhit := lr*rdl::;hl /\ r::;dmod 
(r 2 dmod) V (I rd 121 rdthr I) V 
( taur < trthr /\ r < rmax) V 
(Ir* rd 1::; hl /\ r ::; dmod) 
~trthr V r2':rmax) 
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true (r 2 dmod) V (I rd 121 rdthr I) V (I r*rd 1::; hl /\ r::; dmod) 
rhit := lr*rdj::;hl /\ r::;dmod rhit := true 
Safety Constraints 
(r 2 dmod) V (I rd 121 rdthr I) V rhit 
Figure 5.10: Control Flow of Range-Test Procedure 
d r,rd,dmo 
rdthr,zt hr l C1 = ( T' 2:: d mod) V (J rd J2:: rdthr) 
Setup-Parameters 
tvpcmd, 
trthr,tvt 
hl, 
c2 = (Jr* r d J::=; hl) A (r < dmod) 
rz,rzd,a, 
taur,trtru, 
hr 
• 
Hit-Test-Init 
adot 
• r 
Compute-Tau 
tauv c3 = (taur 
• 
if 1( C1 V C2 
< trthr) A (r < rdthr) A (r:::; rmax) 
V c3 ) then WARN RANGE HAZARD 
Compute-VMD-HMD 
vmd, hm d 
• 
Range-Test 
Figure 5.11: Propagation of WP from Range-Test Task 
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errors. If, on the other hand, the condition ci is FALSE, the condition c2 
(Ir* rd l:S; hl) V (r :S; dmod) 
is the second line of defense. Its predicate is expressed using variables internal or 
external to the routine. In such cases, the development of run-time assertions requires 
that either the values of the variables (i.e., r, dmod) or the predicate (i.e., r < dmod) 
be passed from one module to another. Similarly, the predicate c3 
(taur < trthr) /\ (r < rdthr) /\ (r:::; rmax) 
serves as the last line of defense toward the satisfaction of the Range-Test safety 
constraints. Figure 5.11 shows the assertions inserted to detect the occurrences of 
hazardous states. 
Similarly, Figure 5.12 shows how the following weakest precondition of the Al-
titude-Test task is distributed as the safety constraints of other modules: 
(r ~ dmod V I rd 1~1 rdthr I) V 
(a~zthrV lvmdl<zdthr) /\ 
(a < zthr V adot < zdthr) /\ 
( tauv < tvthr) /\ 
a < zthr V adot ~ zdthr V (I vmd I< zthr V I hmd I< dmod) /\ 
(I vmd I< zthr V tauv < trtru) 
= di V ( ( d2 V d6) /\ ( 1d2 V d3) /\ ( 1d2 V 1 d3 V ( d4 /\ ( ds V d6) /\ ( d6 V d1)))) 
The truth of condition di ensures the satisfaction of the safety constraints. Since the 
Hit-Test-Init may control the truth of only predicates d2 and d3 , one can consider the 
following cases: 
In the first case, the assertions are introduced within the Compute-VMD-HMD 
procedure that are triggered when the condition (•di /\ 1 d2 /\ 1 d5) holds. Similarly, 
r,rd d d , mo, 1 d1 = (r ~ dm od) V (I rd I~ rdthr) rd thr,zthr 
Setup-Parameters 
pcmd,hl, tv 
trt 
rz, 
taur,t 
hr,tvthr 
* 
Hit-Test-Init 
rzd,a,adot 
• 
d2 =a~ zth r 
zdthr d3 = adot < 
if (-id1 /\ d2 /\ -.d3 ) then WARN HAZARD ALTITUDE 1 
Compute-Tau 
rtru,tauv 
d4 = tauv < t 
ds = tauv < t 
t if ( -.d1 /\ d2 /\ 
vthr 
rtru 
d3 /\ -.d4 ) then WARN HAZARD ALTITUDE 2 
Compute-VMD-HMD 
d6 =Jvmdl < zthr 
< dmod 
vm d, hmd d1 =I hmd I if (-id1 /\ -.d 2 /\ -.d6 ) then WARN HAZARD ALTITUDE 3; 
if (-id1 /\ d2 /\ d3 /\ -.d6) then 
.. 
if -.( ds /\ d7 ) then WARN HAZARD ALTITUDE 4; 
Altitude-Test 
Figure 5.12: Propagation of WP from Altitude-Test Task 
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d2 =FALSE vVP = d6 
d2 = TRUE, d3 = FALSE WP= FALSE 
d2 = TRUE, d3 = TRUE vV P = d4 /\ d6 /\ ( ds V d1) 
Table 5.1: Derivation of Run-Time Assertions 
warnings of expected violations of the safety constraints of the Altitude-Test task are 
issued if the condition (-.d1 /\ d2 /\ -.d3 ) holds. Table 5.1 shows how to develop the 
assertions that detect the potentially hazardous software states for the last case. 
The identification of the safety-critical modules and the derivation of their safety 
constraints are similarly applied to other procedures. For example, the safety con-
straints of the Compute-VNID-HMD procedure are: 
(I vmd I< zthr) /\ (I hmd I< dmod) 
while that of the Hit-Test-Init procedure is: 
(a< zthr) V (adot < zdthr) 
The continued application of backward analysis reveals the safety-critical modules, 
their safety constraints, and the safety-critical variables. 
The backward analysis technique is used during the software design phase for 
the following reasons: 
• To identify the safety-critical modules and to derive their safety constraints 
during the high-level design phase. 
I 
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• To verify the safety of the safety-critical modules in the detailed design phase 
and to derive the contents of the run-time assertions that make the software 
more robust against potentially hazardous internal states. 
Despite the use of concurrency in the Threat-Detection procedure, concurrency 
safety verification is unnecessary since there are no safety-critical variables that are 
subject to race conditions. Not all concurrent executions of safety-critical modules 
require concurrency safety verification. 
The analysis reveals that all the modules except the Log-Threat-Info are safety-
critical and that the safety-critical variables taur, trtru, vmd, hrnd are shared be-
tween the safety-critical modules and the safety-independent module. 
5.4 An Improved TCAS Design 
Upon the completion of the software design phase, a detailed desig~ document 
whose safety can be certified must be produced. The safety-critical modules must 
be clearly identified as such and protected from the safety-independent modules to 
ensure the absence of hazardous side-effects. The following PDL descriptions show 
how the basic design of the Threat-Detection TCAS subsystem can be augmented with 
assertions to detect the occurrences - regardless of their causes - of the potentially 
hazardous software states. 4 The augmented design also introduces several variables 
(e.g., log-vmd, log-hmd, etc) serving as a medium for unidirectional data flow from 
the safety-critical modules to the safety-independent module. 
4The lines that are missing in or different from the less robust TCAS design are indicated by 
asterisks. 
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* package Detect-Threat-Critical is 
* procedure Threat-Detect; - - no longer main procedure 
* - - types definitions are assumed 
* distance log-vmd, log-hmd; - - for unidirectional data-flow 
* second log-taur, log-trtru; 
* boolean log-hitflg; 
* end Detect-Threat-Critical; 
* package body Detect-Threat-Critical is 
* procedure Threat-Detect; 
begin 
Setup-Parameters; 
hitflg := FALSE; 
Track-Firmness-Test (firm); 
if (firm) then 
Hit-or-Miss-Test (zhit, rhit ); 
hitflg := zhit /\ rhit; 
else 
hitflg := FALSE; 
end if; 
log-hitflg := hitflg; 
end Threat-Detect; 
- - other procedures invisible to outside package go here 
- - Compute-Tau is shown below as an example 
* end Detect-Threat-Critical; 
Figure 5.13: Firewall Installation 
78 
I 
procedure Compute-Tau is 
begin 
tauv := - aclot; 
trtru :=max (mintau, - dt r ); - - true tau r emp 
if (r > 0) then 
r_dmod2 
taur := - r 
rd temp 
else 
taur := mintau; 
end if; 
taur :=max (mintau, taur); - - modified tau 
* c3 := taur<trthr /\ r <rdthr /\ r :::;rmax; 
* d4 := tauv < tvthr; 
* d5 := tauv < trtru; 
* if • (cl V c2 V c3) then 
* WARN RANGE HAZARD; - - place recovery routine if desired 
* end if; 
* if ( • dl /\ d2 /\ d3 /\ •d4) then 
* WARN ALTITUTE HAZARD 2 
* end if; 
* log-taur := taur; - - assign values for unidirectional data-flow 
* log-trtru := trtru; 
end Compute-Tau; 
Figure 5.14: Safety-Critical Module Augmentation with Run-Time Assertions 
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* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
- -- - - - - --~------------
procedure Main is 
begin 
Threat-Detect; 
if (log-hitflg) then 
Log-Threat-Info; 
end if 
end Main; 
procedure Log-Threat-Info is 
begin 
- - append the threat info to the end of threat-log-file 
seek (threat-log-file, eof); 
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* save ITF.ID, log-taur, log-trtru, log-vmd, log-hmd, time-of-day 
end Log-Threat-Info; 
Figure 5.15: Main Procedure and Safety-Independent Module 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Work 
6.1 Conclusions 
This dissertation proposes a safety-oriented design method whose goal is to 
minimize the amount of safety-critical code and to produce a design whose safety can 
be certified. Backward analysis, which was used to verify safety of source code, is 
used to guide the software design process. Design hazard analysis allows the analyst 
to augment the design being developed with run-time assertions or rendezvous, as 
appropriate, to prevent the occurrence of hazardous software states. It is also shown 
that a limited backtracking can be applied to resolve safety constraint conflicts upon 
the detection of unsafe modules. 
Information hiding is recommended as a means of protecting the safety-critical 
modules from the others so that the safety verification needs to be applied only 
on the former. Safety verification is a labor-intensive and costly process. While 
firewalls alone do not necessarily make software safer, they minimizes the cost of 
safety verification during the development and maintenance phases. 
This dissertation also proposes an incremental and selective verification tech-
nique that further reduces the complexity of design safety verification. It argues that 
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concurrency decisions on safety-critical software must be based on careful trade-off 
analysis. The dissertation proposes a criterion where the use of concurrency in the 
safety-critical software development can be justified. It also argues that a concurrent 
design does not necessarily require exhaustive concurrency safety verifications. 
The management aspect of software safety is as important as the technical one. 
This dissertation examines how to organize safety-critical projects and to distribute 
safety responsibilities. 
While the design of safety-critical software remams a challenging task, this 
dissertation provides useful guidelines on how the design activity can be organized 
around the goal of enhancing safety. 
6.2 Future Work 
Safety-critical software has direct and significant impact on the lives of the 
general public. The following research is in order: 
• Industrial application and evaluation. The safety-oriented method pro-
posed in this dissertation is practical and seems applicable on large industrial 
projects as demonstrated on a subsystem of the TCAS II design. The applica-
tion of the method to various industrial projects would reveal its applicability 
and scalability. The method is currently being applied on an air traffic control 
system being developed. 
• Software Safety Requirements Derivation and Analysis. The appli-
cation of the safety-oriented design method proposed in this dissertation can 
I 
83 
produce a design whose safety can be certified. However, a design is safe only 
when the software safety requirements are correctly derived. 
Software safety requirements are derived by performing system hazard analysis 
such as fault tree analysis and Petri Net analysis(34]. The success of fault tree 
analysis heavily depends on the capability of analysts due to its informal nature. 
While Petri Net analysis is useful in determining how a system might fail, its 
applicability on large industrial systems is not yet proven. It is also unclear 
how fail-soft behavior of a system can be modeled in Petri Nets. 
• Safe design derivation. This dissertation demonstrates how a decomposi-
tion proposed by the designer can be evaluated from safety viewpoints. With 
increasing use of formal specification languages, it may be possible to mechan-
ically derive a safe design from the requirements specification. 
• Programming language constructs. Further works are necessary in guid-
ing safety-critical software design activities and in enhancing safety through 
programming language constructs. 
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